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INTRODUCTION
On March 19, 2011, American forces began attacking various
targets controlled by Muammar el-Qaddafi as part of NATO's support
for the Libyan antigovernment resistance.' Promising that no ground
t B.A., Brandeis University, 2010; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2013; Notes
Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 98. 1 am deeply indebted to Professors Michael C. Dorf
and Aziz F. Rana for their support and guidance throughout this process. Furthermore,
thanks to the many members of the Cornell Law Review for their time, effort, and light-
hearted demeanor, particularly Sue Pado, Maryam Toossi, Katherine Ensler, and Dan
Bakey. Finally, thanks to my friends (especially Dan Rosenberg) and family for their feed-
back and for constantly challenging me to develop the ideas presented here.
I David D. Kirkpatrick et al., Allies Open Air Assault on Qaddafi's Forces, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/world/africa/
20libya.html?pagewanted-all.html.
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troops would be used during these operations, 2 President Barack
Obama ordered strikes on Qaddafi forces using Tomahawk missiles
and bombings from warplanes.3 This order would later include the
use of unmanned Predator drones, signaling a shift toward a support-
ing role for NATO. 4 Fighting lasted for months, ultimately culminat-
ing in the ousting of Qaddafi by rebel forces.5
Despite the limited nature of the U.S. intervention, questions
concerning the legality of the President's actions quickly arose.6
Under the 1973 War Powers Resolution (WPR),7 which was enacted in
the wake of protests during the Vietnam War, the President is re-
quired to cease any use of military forces in "hostilities" within sixty
days of the conflict's beginning unless he receives congressional au-
thorization to the contrary." Having acted without any support from
Congress in the first sixty days, the President had seemingly presented
a clear example of a WPR violation. Yet President Obama and State
Department legal adviser Harold Koh rejected this view by arguing
that the use of force in Libya had not involved the type of "hostilities"
covered by the WPR.9 Emphasizing the absence of U.S. casualties and
lack of exposure to "exchanges of fire with hostile forces," the Presi-
dent stood firmly behind his decision to intervene in Libya without
consulting Congress.' 0
2 Id
3 Elisabeth Bumiller & Kareem Fahim, U.S.-Led Assaults Hit Tripoli Again; Objective Is
Near, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/
world/africa/22ibya.html?pagewanted=all.html.
4 Julian E. Barnes & Charles Levinson, U.S. Drones Hit Targets in Libya, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 25, 2011, at A9, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB0001424052748704489
604576282703009692640.html; Charlie Savage & Thorn Shanker, Scores of U.S. Strikes in
Libya Followed Handoff to NATO, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at A8, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/06/21/world/africa/21powers.html.
5 Kareem Fahim et al., Qaddafi, Seized by Foes, Meets a Violent End, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 21,
2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/africa/qaddafi-is-
killed-as-libyan-forces-take-surt.html?pagewanted=all.html.
6 See Charlie Savage, Libya Effort Is Called Violation of War Act, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
2011, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/world/middleeast/
26powers.html.
7 War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2006)).
8 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1543(a) (1), 1544(b).
9 See Libya and War Powers: Hearng on S. J Res. 20 Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 112th Cong. 5-7 (2011) [hereinafter Libya and War Powers Hearing] (statement of
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State), available at http://foreign.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KohTestimony.pdf; Memorandum and Report from U.S.
Dep't of State and U.S. Dep't of Defense to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House of
Representatives 25 (June 15, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2011/06/16/us/politics/20110616...POWERSDOC.html?ref=politics.html.
10 See Libya and War Powers Hearing, supra note 9, at 8.
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Legislators, pundits, and academics alike broadly criticized this
legal analysis." Yet aside from these particularized complaints, the
President ultimately faced no discernible repercussions (judicial, legis-
lative, or social challenges) for his actions.12 From a historical per-
spective, the absence of substantial backlash is unsurprising: since its
inception, the WPR has generally failed to prevent presidents from
using military action in an arguably illegal manner.'3 In those situa-
tions, courts,' 4 legislators,15 and social movements' 6 have failed to
challenge this sort of presidential action, setting the stage for Presi-
dent Obama's similar neglect of the WPR.
But perhaps we can examine the apathetic treatment of President
Obama's actions in Libya in a different light, one that focuses on the
changing nature and conception of warfare itself. Contrary to larger-
scale conflicts like the Vietnam War, where public (and political) out-
rage set the stage for Congress's assertion of war-making power
through the WPR,"7 the recent U.S. intervention did not involve a
draft, nor a change in domestic industry (requiring, for example, civil-
11 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Libya's Looming Deadline, WASH. POST,
May 18, 2011, at A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/death-of-the-
war-powers-act/2011/05/17/AF3Jh35Gstory.html ("[H]istory will say that the War Powers
Act was condemned to a quiet death by a president who had solemnly pledged, on the
campaign trail, to put an end to indiscriminate warmaking."); Jack Goldsmith, Problems with
the Obama Administration's War Powers Resolution Theory, LAWFARE BLOC (June 16, 2011, 8:38
AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/06/problems-with-the-obama-administra-
tion%E2%80%99s-war-powers-resolution-theory-2/ ("I do not find the [Obama] Adminis-
tration's arguments persuasive."); William Saletan, Koh Is My God Pilot, SLATE (June 30,
2011, 7:54 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2298116/ (arguing that the Obama Administra-
tion is "trying to have it both ways" by implying that there are instances where the WPR
applies to drone strikes, but not in the Libyan campaign).
12 Although Representative Dennis Kucinich attempted to bring a claim against Presi-
dent Obama, the suit was subsequently dismissed for lack of standing. See Kucinich v.
Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 125 (D.D.C. 2011).
13 See Michael C. Dorf, Is the Military Action in Libya Constitutional?, DORF ON LAW (Mar.
22, 2011, 12:16 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/03/is-military-action-in-libya.html
("By my tally, four of the five Presidents to have served in the last 30 years have gone to war
illegally.").
14 See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (deferring to
the expertise of Congress in dismissing a congressional WPR claim); Lowry v. Reagan, 676
F. Supp. 333, 341 (D.D.C. 1987) (invoking the political question doctrine in dismissing a
congressional WPR claim).
15 SeeJOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY- CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM
AND ITS AFTERMATH 49 (1993) (listing "congressional irresolution" as a factor in concluding
that "the War Powers Resolution has not worked").
16 For example, despite the constitutional questions surrounding the 1983 U.S. inva-
sion of Grenada, see Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (constitu-
tional challenge filed by eleven members of Congress), the President nevertheless enjoyed
"broad popular support for his decision," see Ed Magnuson et al., Getting Back to Normal,
TIME, Nov. 21, 1983, at 18.
17 See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 102 (1972) ("Unhappi-
ness about Vietnam led Congress to seek remedies for what some thought to be the consti-
tutional problems it reflected.").
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ians to ration food), and, perhaps most importantly, did not result in
any American casualties.18 Consequently, most analyses of the Libyan
campaign focused on its monetary costs and other economic harms to
American taxpayers.' 9 This type of input seems too nebulous to cause
any major controversy, especially when contrasted with the concurrent
costs associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 20 In a sense,
less is at stake when drones, not human lives, are on the front lines,
limiting the potential motivation of a legislator, judge, or antiwar ac-
tivist to check presidential action.2 1 As a result, the level of nonexecu-
tive involvement in foreign military affairs has decreased.
The implications are unsettling: by ameliorating many of the con-
cerns often associated with large-scale wars, technology-driven warfare
has effectively removed the public's social and political limitations
that previously discouraged a President from using potentially illegal
military force. As President Obama's conduct illustrates, removing
these barriers has opened the door to an unfettered use of unilateral
executive action in the face of domestic law.22 Consequently, as war
becomes more and more attenuated from the American psyche, a
President's power to use unilateral force without repercussions will
likely continue to grow.
Should the public care that the WPR no longer seems to present
a barrier to presidential action? Or, put another way, if the WPR
stands for the proposition that the President should not use force uni-
laterally,23 does that purpose remain relevant given the increased use
of technology in modern warfare? This Note answers that question in
38 See Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya
Operation, N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 2011, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
06/16/us/politics/ 16powers.html?pagewanted=all.html (noting that, contrary to other
conflicts, the U.S. strikes in Libya did not involve troops on the ground or American
casualties).
19 See, e.g., Christopher Drew, Initial Costs of Libyan Intervention on Low End of Analysts'
Estimates, N.Y. TimEs BLoG (Mar. 25, 2011, 4:53 PM), http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/03/25/initial-costs-of-libyan-intervention-on-1ow-end-of-analysts-estimates/?ref=ibya;
Devin Dwyer, US Military Intervention in Libya Cost At Least $896 Million, ABC NEws BLOC
(Aug. 22, 2011, 6:43 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/08/us-military-in-
tervention-in-libya-cost-at-least-896-million/.
20 See Home and Away: Casualties, CNN.coM, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/
war.casualties/index.html (keeping track of U.S. and coalition casualties abroad, which
currently total over seven thousand killed in action).
21 See P.W. SINCER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE RoOTIcs REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE
TwENrY-FIRsT CENTURY 319-20 (2009) ("Unmanned systems represent the ultimate break
between the public and its military.").
22 SeeJules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1418
(1989) ("It is hard to discern any progress from the post-war era of drastic abuses that
Congress wanted to end.").
23 See ELY, supra note 15, at 47 ("What is at stake-and was so understood by the
framers-is the judgment that no single individual should be able to take the nation into
war and thereby risk the lives of all of us, especially our young people.").
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the affirmative by illustrating the issues created by a toothless WPR in
the face of modern advances in military technology and tactics. While
the limited nature of technology-driven warfare might ostensibly re-
move the traditional costs associated with war, many of the concerns
held by those who drafted the WPR nevertheless remain.
Part I provides a brief history of the WPR, including its creation
and subsequent treatment by presidents, courts, and legislators. Spe-
cifically, this Part reviews a number of military actions that arguably
violated the WPR but were largely ignored by the judiciary and
Congress.
Part II examines the ways in which an increased level of citizen
attentiveness and mobilization has previously carried significant politi-
cal weight during wartime, only to wane through the advent of tech-
nology-driven warfare and the modern trend toward a limited, "no
troops on the ground" style of warfare. This Part further examines
the effects of such a shift: namely, that technology-driven warfare
removes many of the more obvious costs of war seen in larger-scale
conflicts, which in turn has limited the will of politicians and activists
to mobilize in order to check potentially illegal presidential action.
Part III explains why a President unrestrained by the WPR, even
in the era of technology-driven warfare, creates significant risks that
will become prominent as warfare becomes increasingly removed
from mainstream consciousness.
I
HISTORY OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
By 1972, the United States had been engaged in Vietnam for over
a decade, with over fifty thousand American casualties to show for it.24
Public support for the war had dwindled,25 and mounting pressure
pushed Congress to reassert its power to declare war.26 The result was
24 See Statistical Information About Casualties of the Vietnam War, GACCF Recori Counts by
Year ofDeath or Declaration ofDeath (as of 12/98), NAT'L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/
research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html#year (last visited Sept. 24, 2012).
25 See William L, Lunch & Peter W. Sperlich, American Public Opinion and the War in
Vietnam, 32 W. POL. Q. 21, 27-28 tbl.2 (1979) (noting that, based on numerous poll results,
support for a withdrawal from Vietnam rose from thirteen percent in 1964 to a high of
seventy-three percent in 1972).
26 See ROBERT D. CLARK ET AL., THE WAR PowERs RESOLUTION: BALANCE OF WAR POW-
ERS IN THE EicHrnss 5 (1985) ("[Tlhe Resolution was enacted near the end of the Vietnam
War by a Congress that reemphasized its constitutional right to decide when the United
States would become involved in a war or ... [when] the use of armed force might lead to
war."); Cassandra L. Wilkinson, Comment, Constitutional Law: The Province and Duty of the
judicial Department: Why the Court Cannot Continue to Use Justiciability to Avoid Dealing with the
Tension Between Congress and the President Regarding the War Powers, 56 OKLA. L. REv. 697, 703
(2003) ("The [HATR] came as a direct response to the executive branch's abuse of the war
powers that led to the Vietnam War."). Congress was also responding to a perceived en-
croachment on its constitutional power "[tlo declare War." U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11;
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the WPR,27 a compromise of sorts whereby the President is granted
the power to fend off "momentary threats" but must consult with Con-
gress before taking any further action.28 Under the terms of the WPR,
the President is required "in every possible instance" to consult with
Congress before introducing American forces into "hostilities,"29 and
must provide a written report within forty-eight hours of said hostili-
ties.s0 Section 1544 (the "heart of the War Powers Resolution") 3' re-
quires the President to cease all military operations unless Congress
has said otherwise sixty days after the initial report (with an option of
a thirty-day extension).32 Heralded as fulfilling "the intent of the
framers,"33 the WPR garnered enough support to survive a subsequent
veto by President Richard Nixon.3"
Despite these optimistic beginnings, however, the WPR's subse-
quent treatment in all three branches of government has illustrated its
shortcomings.s 5 Though much of the WPR's ineffectiveness might
arise out of issues concerning the structure and language of the WPR
itself,36 those applying the law have exploited these defects, rendering
the law "practically useless."37 A brief review of the wartime experi-
ence under the WPR demonstrates how these inadequacies limited
the WPR's actual effectiveness.
A. The President Under the WPR
President Nixon's initial veto would ultimately serve as an omen
for the WPR's treatment by the executive branch, as subsequent presi-
see Louis Fisher & David Gray Adler, The War Powers Resolution: Time to Say Goodbye, 113 POL.
Sci. Q. 1, 7 (1998) (noting that the Framers were determined to "preclude unilateral presi-
dential authority to initiate military actions"); Wilkinson, supra, at 704 ("The Resolution is
also based on the intent of the framers of the Constitution, who indicated in their com-
ments that they felt that the power to wage war was much too great to leave to the Presi-
dent alone.").
27 War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2006)),
28 Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the
Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 Mic-. L. REV. 447, 449 (2011).
29 50 U.S.C. § 1542.
30 Id. § 1543(a) (3).
31 See CLARK ET AL., supra note 26, at 6.
32 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
3 Id. § 1541(a).
34 See Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 130 (1995).
3 See ELY, supra note 15, at 49 ("[T)hanks to a combination of presidential defiance,
congressional irresolution, and judicial abstention, the War Powers Resolution has not
worked.").
36 See, e.g., Fisher & Adler, supra note 26, at 1 ("[The WPR] was ill conceived and
badly compromised from the start, replete with tortured ambiguity and self-
contradiction.").
37 See Patrick D. Robbins, The War Powers Resolution After Fifteen Years: A Reassessment, 38
AM. U. L. REv. 141, 142 (1988).
dents have generally failed to comply with the terms of the WPR.3 8
This trend began as early as 1974, when President Nixon failed to file
a WPR report after deploying troops to evacuate American civilians
from Cyprus,3 9 and continued into the Ford administration, when the
President engaged in operations to rescue the captured U.S.
merchant ship Mayaguez but only informed Congress after the opera-
tion was completed. 40 Not to be outdone, the Reagan administration
simply refused to comply with the WPR when it sent military "advisers"
to El Salvador, introducing WPR violations into a nonrescue con-
text.4 ' In each case, the President either avoided all responsibilities
under the WPR or complied with them after the fact, when their rele-
vance had all but disappeared.
While these situations might be classified as small-scale opera-
tions, the WPR has fared no better in situations involving troops enter-
ing real combat zones. For example, when President Ronald Reagan
deployed eight hundred troops to Lebanon in 1982, an operation that
involved direct exchange of fire between U.S. Marines and Lebanese
militiamen, he did so without reporting to Congress.42 Later, Presi-
dent Reagan's 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada, which involved one
thousand nine hundred U.S. soldiers (in addition to approximately
three hundred troops from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States), arguably violated the WPR because no "consultation" within
the WPR's meaning appeared to have taken place.4 3 Finally, and per-
haps most dramatically, President Bill Clinton's deployment of over
twenty thousand troops to Haiti in 1994 (and subsequent threat to
invade) was not accompanied by any congressional approval, thereby
38 See FISHER, supra note 34, at 192 ("Presidents have generally done what they wanted
to do, notwithstanding the War Powers Resolution."); Jonathan T. Menitove, Once More
unto the Breach: American War Power and a Second Legislative Attempt to Ensure Congressional
Input, 43 U. MicH. J.L. REFORm 773, 796 (2010) ("Perhaps the most significant problem
facing the War Powers Resolution is presidential disregard."); Ronald D. Rotunda, The War
Powers Act in Perspective, 2 MicH. L. & POL'v REv. 1, 1 (1997) ("[I]n the decades that have
passed, both liberals and conservatives, whether Republican or Democrat, have all attacked
the law.").
39 See ROBERT F. TURNER, THE WAR PowERs RESOLUTION: ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE-
ORY AND PRACTIcE 47-48 (1983).
40 See FISHER, supra note 34, at 136-37. The Carter Administration, for its own part,
did no better. See CLARK ET AL., supra note 26, at 24-25 (detailing PresidentJimmy Carter's
failure to present a WPR report to Congress before engaging in rescue operations during
the Iranian hostage crisis).
41 See TURNER, supra note 39, at 73-74 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 See FISHER, supra note 34, at 140; Robbins, supra note 37, at 164.
43 See Robbins, supra note 37, at 165-66 (internal quotation marks omitted). I say
"arguably" because while no such consultation took place, President Reagan withdrew all
combat troops before the sixty-day period had ended, thereby avoiding any WPR confron-
tation. See FISHER, supra note 34, at 142. At the very least, the congressional suit that fol-
lowed, see infra note 58, implies that there were some constitutional questions arising from
Grenada.
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illustrating "the clearest example of the executive acting in direct con-
flict with Congress' views and .. . the mandate of the [WPR]."" Nu-
merous other military conflicts illustrate similar presidential disregard
for the WPR.4 5
Notably, in each of these situations, the serving President did not
simply ignore the WPR, despite his general belief that it was unconsti-
tutional.46 Rather, the presidents circumvented the WPR's applica-
tion by proffering suspect rationales to avoid compliance. One of the
more common methods of achieving this end involves denying the
existence of the WPR's "hostilities"-triggering requirement.4 7 In those
situations, presidents have emphasized the limited nature of the mili-
tary action, either by focusing on whether there was an actual ex-
change of fire between the United States and hostile forces,48 whether
the United States introduced ground troops into the hostile area,49 or,
as seen during the recent actions in Libya, whether the United States
had suffered any casualties.50 Despite the often negative treatment of
these justifications, 51 presidents have nevertheless faced few repercus-
sions from employing them. Given this background, it should be no
surprise that President Obama was able to circumvent the WPR in a
similar manner without any major political scars to show for it.
44 Michael Mandel, Note, A License to Kill: America's Balance of War Powers and the Flaws
of the War Powers Resolution, 7 CAozo Pus. L. PoL'v & ETmIcs J. 785, 804-05 (2009).
45 See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 34, at 142-43 (discussing President Reagan's WPR viola-
tions in the 1986 airstrikes in Libya); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Clinton Administration and
War Powers, 63 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 125, 135-38 (2000) (detailing the WPR questions
associated with President Clinton's actions in Bosnia and Kosovo).
46 SeeJ. Richard Broughton, What Is It Good for? War Power, Judicial Review, and Constitu-
tional Deliberation, 54 OKaA. L. REv. 685, 689 (2001) ("Since its enactment, no President has
explicitly approved of the War Powers Resolution and all have disputed its constitutionality
in light of the Commander in Chief Clause.").
47 See Robbins, supra note 37, at 161-62. Of course, presidents have offered a pleth-
ora of arguments to avoid the WPR's reach. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 34, at 144 (discuss-
ing the Reagan administration's WPR argument that the 1987 U.S. naval engagement with
Iran in the Persian Gulf was an act of self-defense); John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a
War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 1379, 1381 (1988) (noting that a President
can circumvent (and presidents have circumvented) the WPR by "fail[ing] to specify that
what [the President] is filing is a (WPR] 'hostilities' report, thus avoiding the 60-day
clock"); Fisher & Adler, supra note 26, at 11-12 (describing the Clinton administration's
WPR theory surrounding the threatened invasion of Haiti, which included the belief that
the WPR inherently authorizes unilateral presidential action).
48 See Robbins, supra note 37, at 162-63 (discussing President Reagan during the con-
flict in El Salvador).
49 See Damrosch, supra note 45, at 137-38 (discussing President Clinton during the
conflict in Kosovo).
50 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
51 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Often, this backlash takes the form of a
congressional lawsuit. See infra Part I.C.
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B. The Judiciary Under the WPR
By now, the general pattern concerning presidential treatment of
the WPR should be clear: when faced with a situation in which the
WPR should, by its own terms, come into play, presidents circumvent
its application by proffering questionable legal analyses. Yet, as was
frequently the case following the aforementioned presidential actions,
those looking to the courts for support were disappointed to learn
that the judiciary would be of little help. Indeed, congressional and
private litigants have similarly been unsuccessful in their efforts to
check potentially illegal presidential action. 52
The suits arising out of possible WPR violations are well-docu-
mented 3 and therefore only require a brief review. Generally, when
faced with a question concerning the legality of presidential military
action, courts have punted the issue using a number of procedural
tools to avoid ruling on the merits. For example, when twenty-nine
representatives filed suit after President Reagan's possible WPR viola-
tion in El Salvador, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed the suit on political question grounds.54 Similar suits were
dismissed for issues involving standing,55 mootness,5 6 ripeness,57 or
nonjusticiability because Congress could better handle fact-finding.5 8
Despite the varying grounds for dismissing WPR suits, a general theme
has emerged: absent action taken by Congress itself, the judiciary can-
not be counted on to step in to check the President.
To be sure, the judiciary's unwillingness to review cases arising
from WPR disputes arguably carries some merit. Two examples illus-
52 See Fisher & Adler, supra note 26, at 12.
53 See, e.g., id. at 12-14 (detailing the congressional suits filed following various presi-
dential military actions); FISHER, supra note 34, at 197-98 (same); Broughton, supra note
46, at 704-07 (same).
54 See Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 902-03 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 720 F.2d 1355
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (congressional suit challenging President Reagan's actions in El Salva-
dor); see also Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 341 (D.D.C. 1987) (dismissing a similar
suit filed following President Reagan's actions in the Persian Gulf by using the political
question doctrine).
55 See Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45 (D.D.C. 1999) (congressional suit
challenging President Clinton's use of force in Yugoslavia).
56 See Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (congressional suit
challenging President Reagan's invasion of Grenada); see also Whitney v. Obama, 845 F.
Supp. 2d 136, 139-40 (D.D.C. 2012) (suit challenging President Obama's actions in
Libya).
57 See Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1152 (D.D.C. 1990) (congressional suit
challenging President George H. W. Bush's initial actions in Iraq). The court further
noted that the ripeness issue could possibly be remedied, but only if Congress first con-
fronted an uncooperative President. See id. The result, however, was a framework whereby
a President can commit troops to combat unless and until Congress tries to stop him,
rather than placing the onus on the President. See ELY, supra note 15, at 57-58.
58 See FISHER, supra note 34, at 198 n.40 (citing Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F.
Supp. 596, 600 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 770 F.2d 202, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
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trate this point. First, although a serviceperson ordered into combat
might have standing to sue, congressional standing is less clear.59 In-
deed, debates rage throughout war powers literature concerning
whether congressional suits should even be heard on their merits.60
And though some courts have held that a member of Congress can
have standing when a President acts unilaterally, holding that such
unauthorized actions amount to "disenfranchisement,"61 subsequent
decisions and commentators have thrown the entire realm of legisla-
tive standing into doubt.6 2 Though the merits of this debate are be-
yond the scope of this Note, it is sufficient to emphasize that a
member of Congress arguably suffers an injury when a President vio-
lates the WPR because the presidential action prevents the congress-
person from being able to vote (namely, on whether to authorize
hostilities),63 thereby amounting to disenfranchisement by
"preclu[ding] . . a specific vote . . . by a presidential violation of
law .. . ."64 As such, under the right circumstances, perhaps the stand-
ing doctrine should not be as problematic as history seems to indicate
when a congressperson attempting to have a say on military action
brings a WPR suit.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it is arguably unclear
what, if any, remedy is available to potential litigants. Unlike a private
lawsuit, where a court can impose a simple fine or jail sentence, suits
against the executive branch carry a myriad of practical issues. For
example, if the remedy is an injunction, issues concerning enforce-
ment arise: Who enforces it and how?65 Or, if a court makes a declara-
tory judgment stating that the President has acted illegally, it might
invite open defiance, thereby creating unprecedented strife among
branches. Yet, a number of possible remedies are indeed available.
For one, courts could simply start the WPR clock, requiring a Presi-
59 See Ely, supra note 47, at 1412 (noting that soldiers sent into war "clearly" have
standing to sue, but also arguing that such suits would either never occur or be untimely).
60 Compare Carlin Meyer, Imbalance of Powers: Can Congressional Lawsuits Serve as Coun-
terweight?, 54 U. Pi-r. L. REV. 63, 119-20 (1992) (arguing that "courts should entertain
congressional claimants whenever they challenge executive conduct that deprives them of
a constitutionally mandated role"), with Anthony Clark Arend & Catherine B. Lotrionte,
Congress Goes to Court: The Past, Present, and Future of Legislator Standing, 25 HARv. J.L. & Pus.
POL.Y 209, 282 (2001) (arguing that courts should "reject legislator standing outright").
61 Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), vacated on other
grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
62 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829-30 (1997); Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 60,
at 273 ("Raines refused to endorse the notion that federal legislators could have standing in
some circumstances; but, conversely, Raines did not explicitly reject the notion of legislator
standing.").
63 See ELY, supra note 15, at 57; Jonathan Wagner, Note, The Justiciability of Congres-
sional-Plaintiff Suits, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 526, 552 (1982).
64 ELY, supra note 15, at 57.
65 See Ely, supra note 47, at 1420 n.118.
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dent to either seek congressional approval or cease all actions within
the time remaining (depending on whether the court starts the clock
from the beginning or applies it retroactively).66 In doing so, a court
would trigger the WPR in the same way that Congress would have had
it acted alone. On a similar note, a court could declare the relevant
military conflict illegal under the WPR, thereby inviting Congress to
begin impeachment proceedings. 67 Although both cases require
some level of congressional involvement, a court could at least begin
the process of providing a suitable remedy. Thus, the more questiona-
ble issues of standing and remedies should not (under the right cir-
cumstances) prevent a WPR suit from moving forward.
What about the pragmatic issues associated with involving the ju-
diciary in foreign affairs? After all, we might not want our judiciary
entering the world of realpolitik by forcing a President's hand; doing
so would require a large political (and administrative) undertaking
that might take us beyond the bounds of the judiciary's institutional
role. And as previously mentioned, courts do not, and perhaps should
not, want to be in the business of telling the President when or how to
act, especially when such conflict might result in presidential defi-
ance. This position might make sense in a system where we could rely
on congressional action to prevent unilateral action. But given the
dysfunction that overwhelms the legislative branch whenever a Presi-
dent violates the WPR,68 the entire premise of a system emphasizing
no unilateral military action is inverted when the onus is placed
squarely on Congress. If Congress could not go to the courts in order
to prevent further presidential WPR violations, it would be required to
turn to its legislative powers. But doing so would require the approval
of at least a majority of Congress, though two-thirds would seem more
reasonable given the likelihood of a presidential veto. Requiring such
an overwhelming level of congressional support and unity to act is
irrational and unreasonable, especially after considering the ways in
which most Congresses have failed to act on prior occasions.69 Given
this high burden placed on any Congress, even one with majority con-
trol, the judiciary must play some role when a President violates the
WPR. Though the pragmatic issues around judicial intervention re-
quire some recognition, they are, in some respect, the lesser of two
evils.
But beyond the technical barriers courts impose (and the practi-
cal reasons behind them), their consistent refusal to reach the merits
in WPR cases is more fundamentally problematic given the ways in
66 See id. at 1416-17.
67 See id. at 1411 n.91 (arguing in support of judicial intervention).
68 See infra Part I.A.3.
69 See infra Part I.A.3.
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which early U.S. courts handled cases involving unilateral presidential
action.70 One case in particular illustrates the conflict between the
historical and contemporary judicial handling of military cases. Little
v. Barremen' involved the U.S. seizure of a Danish ship sailing from a
French port pursuant to direct orders from President John Adams
that ran contrary to congressional authorization. 7 2 In concluding that
the captain of the U.S. vessel could be held personally liable for dam-
ages,7 3 Chief Justice John Marshall (on behalf of a unanimous court)
held that the President could not circumvent congressional authority,
thereby creating a framework wherein "congressional policy an-
nounced in a statute necessarily prevails over inconsistent presidential
orders and military actions."74 Perhaps most notably, Chief Justice
Marshall never even considered the political question doctrine or any
other judicial avoidance tool in reaching this conclusion.7 5 Thus, Lit-
tle seemingly stands for the proposition that the prevention of unilat-
eral presidential action is not merely an issue of public policy, but
rather part of the structure of the courts' constitutional power. Con-
sequently, per Little, judicial intervention into military affairs should
not be problematic.
But we have clearly shifted toward a new judicial framework that
does not assert the type of judicial authority Chief Justice Marshall
contemplated. The result is that all members of Congress who at-
tempt to challenge presidential military action fail, casting into doubt
the future of WPR suits.
C. Congress Under the WPR
Of course, despite these various suits, Congress has received
much of the blame for the WPR's treatment and failures. For exam-
ple, Congress has been criticized for doing little to enforce the WPR
in using other Article I tools, such as the "power of the purse,"76 or by
closing the loopholes frequently used by presidents to avoid the WPR
70 See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Agvra: The 1994 U.S. Action in Haiti: The Constitutional
Responsibility of Congress for Military Engagements, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 58, 66 (1995)
("[Als . .. judicial decision .. . confirm [s], the congressional prerogative applies not only
to cases of 'war' in the traditional sense, but also to cases of initiation of combat short of
war.").
71 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
72 See id. at 170; FISHER, supra note 34, at 18-19.
73 See Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 179.
74 FISHER, supra note 34, at 19; see also Broughton, supra note 46, at 695 ("Signifi-
cantly, . . . Little recognized Congress's ability to limit presidential, commander in chief
authority."); Lobel, supra note 22, at 1394 ("Courts could sanction executive officials who
violated the law irrespective of the necessity for the actions.").
75 See ELY, supra note 15, at 54-55.
76 See Robbins, supra note 37, at 180 ("[L]egislators failed in earlier attempts to use
Congress' appropriations power to curb presidential war-making."); see also Sanchez-Espi-
noza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (sug-
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in the first place.77 Furthermore, in those situations where Congress
has decided to act, it has done so in such a disjointed manner as to
render any possible check on the President useless. For example, dur-
ing President Reagan's invasion of Grenada, Congress failed to reach
an agreement to declare the WPR's sixty-day clock operative,78 and
later faced similar "deadlock" in deciding how best to respond to Pres-
ident Reagan's actions in the Persian Gulf, eventually settling for a bill
that reflected congressional "ambivalence."79 Thus, between the lack
of a "backbone" to check rogue presidential action and general inepti-
tude when it actually decides to act, 0 Congress has demonstrated its
inability to remedy WPR violations.
Worse yet, much of Congress's interest in the WPR is politically
motivated, leading to inconsistent review of presidential military deci-
sions filled with post-hoc rationalizations. Given the political risk asso-
ciated with wartime decisions,8' Congress lacks any incentive to act
unless and until it can gauge public reaction-a process that often
occurs after the fact.82 As a result, missions deemed successful by the
public will rarely provoke "serious congressional concern" about presi-
dential compliance with the WPR, while failures will draw scrutiny.83
For example, in the case of the Mayaguez, "liberals in the Congress
generally praised [President Gerald Ford's] performance" despite the
constitutional questions surrounding the conflict, simply because the
gesting that Congress use the "formidable weapons at its disposal" before turning to courts
for WPR enforcement help).
77 See ELY, supra note 15; see also CLARK ET AL., supra note 26, at 40 (noting that, despite
the constitutional questions surrounding the WPR, "Congress refuses to amend or alter
any provisions of the War Powers Resolution"); Ely, supra note 47, at 1412-13 (arguing that
Congress could remedy many of the standing issues brought up by courts by amending the
WPR to grant statutory standing).
78 See Robbins, supra note 37, at 166.
79 See id. at 170; see also TURNER, supra note 39, at 56-59 (arguing that Congress "con-
tinued to 'fiddle' with authorization legislation while Indochina 'burned'").
80 SeeJohn Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled) Constitutional-
ity of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 877, 925 (1990).
81 See ELY, supra note 15, at 52 ("Decisions on war and peace are tough, and more to
the point they're politically risky.").
82 This "wait and see" approach is even more problematic given the fact that one of
the purposes behind the WPR was to avoid that type of congressional inaction. See ELY,
supra note 15, at 48 (arguing that the WPR was a response to Congress realizing that "it had
been laying back, neither disapproving presidential military ventures nor forthrightly ap-
proving them, instead letting the president use troops wherever and whenever he wanted
and waiting to see how the war in question played politically").
83 See, e.g., CLARK ET AL., supra note 26, at 41 (arguing that "congressional support or
criticism of presidential use of force reflects the success or failure of the mission, and the
public's reaction, rather than how much Congress is involved in the decisionmaking");
TURNER, supra note 39, at 123 ("More often than not, congressional attitudes toward spe-
cific situations appeared more attuned to public opinion polls than to the requirements of
the law or the Constitution.").
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public deemed it a success. 84 Thus, even if Congress was effective at
checking potentially unconstitutional presidential action, it would
only act when politically safe to do so. This result should be unsurpris-
ing: making a wartime decision provides little advantage for politi-
cians, especially if the resulting action succeeds. 5 Consequently,
Congress itself has taken a role in the continued disregard for WPR
enforcement.
The current WPR framework is broken: presidents avoid it, courts
will not rule on it, and Congress will not enforce it. This cycle has
culminated in President Obama's recent use of force in Libya, which
created little, if any, controversy,86 and it provides a clear pass to fu-
ture presidents, judges, and congresspersons looking to continue the
system of passivity and deferment.
II
THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN WARFARE AS A
PRESIDENTIAL CHECK
A. Public and Political Scrutiny in the Face of "Traditional"
Costs of War
The executive branch has not always had such a large degree of
autonomy during wartime, especially during conflicts featuring what
might be called the "traditional" costs of war (i.e., those wars involving
a draft, staggering military casualties, domestic sacrifices such as ra-
tioning, and other similar costs).**7 In those situations, public atten-
tiveness and scrutiny established a powerful check on presidential
action, requiring politicians to tread a careful line when constructing
policy. The larger-scale wars fought by the United States illustrate this
trend.
First, it is worth setting the stage for the role of public scrutiny in
the twentieth century by examining what might be the first instance of
large-scale war in America: the Civil War, which saw over three million
84 TURNER, supra note 39, at 121.
85 See ELY, supra note 15, at 52. But see Robert E. Paradise, Book Note, The Least Inter-
ested Branch, 107 HARv. L. REV. 2117, 2122 (1994) (arguing that "Ely's pessimism regarding
the possibility of congressionally initiated reform may not be justified").
86 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
87 This list is by no means inclusive of all traditional harms associated with war. For
example, the potential withdrawal of civil liberties during war is well-documented. See, e.g.,
Harold D. Lasswell, The Garrison State, 46 Am. J. Soc. 455, 457-60 (1941) (expressing the
fear that a military state combined with modern technology would pose a threat to a demo-
cratic society). But modem rights-restrictive measures and the implied dignitary costs that
follow rarely take the blatant form that more traditional costs of war, such as human casual-
ties, take. Compare, for example, the PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001), which one could view as an encroachment on the right to privacy, with the Sedi-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553 (1918), which led to blatant arrests and the
outright removal of freedom-of-speech rights.
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soldiers serve in combat and resulted in hundreds of thousands of
casualties.88 With nearly ten percent of the country involved in direct
combat (and the rest providing financial support)89 and nearly all in-
dustry focused on the war effort, the country was literally engrossed in
war for over four years. As a result, President Abraham Lincoln faced
substantial social and political dissent by those seeking to avoid those
costs of war.90 The most significant (and violent) backlash occurred
in response to the 1863 Conscription Act, which required eligible men
to enter a lottery for military duty or pay a sum to avoid service (if
selected).9 ' Starting onJuly 13, mere days after the Union victory in
Gettysburg, rioting broke out in New York City as the draft selection
began, lasting for three days and resulting in more than a hundred
casualties.92 This social backlash presents one of the more explicit
examples of the populace demanding a change in wartime policy
from the President.
The result was that the administration faced significant opposi-
tion from Democrats (or "Copperheads," an "opprobrious epithet"
used by Republicans) who opposed Lincoln's war policies.9 3 Calling
Lincoln a "dictator" and attempting to restore the Union as it was in
1860, the Democrats constituted a substantial check on presidential
action, forcing the administration to tread carefully while implement-
ing policy.9 4 Therefore, as social backlash against wartime policy be-
came more pervasive, a strong system of political accountability
formed, whereby the public and politicians alike closely scrutinized
Union victories and defeats. General William Sherman's timely
march on Atlanta, for example, would ultimately relieve President
Lincoln of the many pressures faced in an election year.95 In this re-
spect, the heavy costs of war introduced an increased level of citizen
88 See ANNE LELAND & MARI-JANA OBOROCEANU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32492,
AMERICAN WAR AND MILITARY OPERATIONS CASUALTIES: LISTS AND STATISTICS 2-4 (2010),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32492.pdf. In comparison, the War of
1812 involved a little over two thousand deaths, while the Revolutionary War, though per-
haps more ideologically important for the United States, similarly resulted in limited casu-
alties. See id. at 2.
89 See I JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM CHRIS-
TOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900), at 208 (2002) (noting that the
Treasury Department imposed tax increases in order to bankroll the Union war effort).
90 See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
91 See IVER BERNSTEIN, THE NEW YORK CITY DRAFT RIoTs: THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FOR
AMERICAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 7-9 (1990).
92 Estimates on the exact figure vary. See id. at 288-89 n.8.
93 See Richard 0. Curry, Coperheadism and Continuity: The Anatomy of a Stereotype, 57 J.
NEGRO HisT. 29, 30 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94 See id.
95 See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATrLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 774-76
(1988); see also id. at 582-83 (noting that Union military success "blunted, temporarily, the
mounting copperhead offensive against the administration's war policy").
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involvement that required the administration to shape its policy in
response to constant public scrutiny.
The U.S. involvement in World War I provided an equally clear
example of citizen mobilization having a meaningful impact on Amer-
ican foreign policy in a scenario involving the traditional costs of war,
thereby setting the stage for similar incidents throughout the twenti-
eth century.96 Prior to the U.S. intervention in World War I, Europe
had already witnessed the deaths of hundreds of thousands of
soldiers, seen an increased use of chemical warfare, and found itself
seemingly stuck in a perpetual stalemate with little hope of achieving
lasting peace.97 Thus, for most Americans, there was obviously much
at stake in deciding whether to intervene, leading many to call for
America's continued isolationism. Figures such as Eugene V. Debs
played prominent roles in rallying the antiwar cause and, in some ex-
treme cases, protestors even took to domestic terrorism in order to
express their opposition to intervention.98 Between assisting its allies
abroad and avoiding major mobilization and harm to its soldiers, the
U.S. public strongly favored the latter.
This public outcry had a clear influence on the decision to enter
World War I. For example, President Woodrow Wilson's reelection
campaign in 1916 included the slogan "[h]e kept us out of war,"99 and
it was only after the United States began suffering civilian casualties at
the hands of German submarines that the country saw a sufficient
shift in public sentiment.100 While U.S. casualties eventually totaled
over one hundred thousand,'01 public pressure successfully kept the
country out of foreign affairs for over two years-nearly half of the
96 See Keith Neilson, Total War: Total History, 51 MIL. Ave. 17, 19 (1987) ("[T]he con-
flict of 1914-1918 was a total war that involved the belligerents in all phases of their na-
tional existence and faced military decision makers with new and complex problems.").
97 For example, a single attack during the Battle of the Somme resulted in twenty
thousand British deaths without making any significant gain. See The Great War and the
Shaping of the 20th Century, The Battle of the Somme, PBS.com, http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/
maps/mapssomme.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2012).
98 See, e.g., JOSEPH T. MCCANN, TERRORISM ON AMERICAN SOIL: A CONCISE HISTORY OF
PLOTS AND PERPETRATORS FROM THE FAMous TO THE FORGOTTEN 46-49 (2006) (detailing
the "San Francisco Preparedness Day Bombing," where a suitcase bomb killed ten people
at a rally supporting increased defense spending and general military preparedness).
09 JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., WOODROw WILSON: A BIOGRAPHY 342 (2009).
100 See Office of the Historian, U.S. Dep't of State, Milestones: 1914-1920: American Entry
into World War 1, 1917, HISTORY.STATE.Gov, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-
1920/WWI (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) ("Germany's resumption of submarine attacks on
passenger and merchant ships in 1917 was the primary motivation behind Wilson's deci-
sion to lead the United States into World War I."). Even then, however, President Wilson
faced strong opposition. SeeJohn Whiteclay Chambers II, Decision for the Draft, OAH MAc.
HisT., Oct. 2002, at 26, 28 (noting that the President's military policy faced "considerable
opposition" and that "it took a month for Wilson to force conscription through a bitterly
divided Congress").
101 LELAND & OBOROCEANU, supra note 88, at 2.
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war. Thus, as the United States experienced its first major conflict in
the twentieth century, the role of public sentiment against war sug-
gested that it could have a meaningful impact on foreign policy in
subsequent military engagements.
But the true power of public attentiveness would not become ap-
parent until the Vietnam War. The growth and prominence of the
Vietnam War antiwar movement is well-documented. 0 2 As American
involvement in Vietnam increased throughout the 1960s, a growing
level of discontent for the war emerged throughout the country, 03
from protests on campuses to the steps of the Capitol, culminating in
a movement that eventually played a major role in the U.S. pullout.
For example, key political players, including President Lyndon John-
son, Henry Kissinger, and Robert McNamara, felt constrained by the
growing movement and were therefore forced to shift their policy in
response.10 4 Similarly, toward the latter part of his term, President
Johnson was forced to act "within the constraints set by public opinion
and protest until it was impossible for his administration to advance
escalation any further." 05 This public backlash culminated in the
complete pullout from Vietnam,106 as well as the passage of the
WPR.10 7
Finally, one can view the nearly decade-long conflict in Iraq as a
unique example of public attentiveness playing a meaningful role in
military policy. For some, the Iraq War stood in stark contrast to Viet-
nam and the other large-scale wars. 08 Indeed, the war did not involve
a draft, nor did the total casualty figures come even close to those
102 See, e.g., CHARLES DEBENEDETrI & CHARLES CHATFIELD, AN AMERICAN ORDEAL: THE
ANTIWAR MOVEMENT OF THE VIETNAM ERA (1990) (detailing the Vietnam antiwar move-
ment); ADAM GARFINKLE, TELLTALE HEARTS: THE ORIGINS AND IMPACT OF THE VIETNAM ANTI-
WAR MOVEMENT (1995) (same).
103 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
104 See RICHARD SOBEL, THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC OPINION ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SINCE
VIETNAM: CONSTRAINING THE COLOSSUS 97 (2001) ("The decision-makers' own words reveal
that public opinion constrained Vietnam policy across the war.").
105 Id. at 67. Unsurprisingly, when these movements died down, the President was able
to act free of any constraints. See id. at 236 ("The decline of the antiwar movement permit-
ted the escalatory bombings in 1972 that led to an armistice in 1973.").
106 See id. at 98 ("By 1973, public opposition had essentially forced the United States to
withdraw from Vietnam.")
107 See HENKIN, supra note 17.
108 See, e.g., COLIN MCINNES, SPECTATOR-SPORT WAR: THE WEST AND CONTEMPORARY
CONFuCT 27 (2002) ("What ... distinguishes the Afghan, Iraqi, and Kosovo operations and
other operations undertaken by Western powers during the post-Cold War era is their
limited and local nature."); SINGER, supra note 21, at 317-18 (comparing the Vietnam War
and World War II to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where "most American families no
longer have to think about whether their husband, wife, son, or daughter would be at risk
if the military is sent to war").
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associated with the aforementioned conflicts.xoo Perhaps as a result,
the public outrage that emerged before our intervention in Iraq
slowly faded in prominence, ostensibly illustrating the ways in which
contemporary warfare has dulled the effect of public scrutiny.110
Given these characteristics, we might see the Iraq War as a more lim-
ited type of war, perhaps more intrusive than the skirmish in Libya but
falling short of the traditional sacrifices associated with Vietnam.
Although featuring distinct characteristics not seen in earlier con-
flicts, we can still classify the Iraq War as one of the few modern wars
involving traditional harms. For instance, although the military casu-
alties suffered in Iraq themselves might seem low compared to World
War I, the public no longer seems able to tolerate a large number of
casualties, making the thousands of troops lost in Iraq sufficient to
trigger citizen mobilization."' Furthermore, although the impact of
public outrage in response to the Iraq War might seem inconsequen-
tial, we can explain the decreased level of social involvement as simply
a shift in the way people protest. While the Vietnam War involved,
perhaps even required, protest in the form of physical visibility, the
advent of the Internet and other means of citizen engagement have
changed the way movements mobilize. 112 Thus, given the different
ways in which the public can now engage in the political process, we
can view the Iraq War as having involved a significant level of citizen
mobilization, culminating in a meaningful impact on the decision to
withdraw." 3 As such, although seemingly incomparable to the earlier
wars in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Iraq War can in-
109 Compare supra note 20 (reporting more than seven thousand casualties in the Iraq
and Afghanistan conflicts), with supra note 97 (reporting more than twenty thousand casu-
alties in a single attack during World War II).
o10 Compare Anti-War Demonstrators Rally Around the World, CNN.com (Jan. 18, 2003),
http://articles.cnn.com/2003-01-18/us/sproject.irq.us.protests-lrally-inspection-team-
iraq? s=PM:US (describing one of the major preinvasion protests, which included "[alt
least tens of thousands of people"), with Limited Protests Target IRS, City's "Pillars of War,"
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2008, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/mar/19/
limited-protests-target-irs-citys-pillars-of-war/ (describing the protest marking the fifth an-
niversary of the Iraq War as drawing "only a fraction of the tens of thousands that typically
come to the nation's capital to protest wars").
I See Thom Shanker et al., In Baghdad, Panetta Leads Uneasy Moment of Closure to a Long
Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/
16/world/middleeast/panetta-in-baghdad-for-iraq-militay-handover-ceremony.htl?sp=
2&sq=iraq&st=cse (noting that over four thousand military deaths in Iraq "helped turn
sentiment at home against the war").
112 For example, numerous websites currently serve as platforms for antiwar move-
ments. See, e.g., STOP THE WAR COALITION, http://stopwar.org.uk/ (last visited Sept. 2,
2012) (protesting the Iraq War); MOVEON.ORG, http://front.moveon.org/ (last visited
Sept. 2, 2012).
1 13 See Shanker et al., supra note 111 (noting that the antiwar sentiment surrounding
Iraq "contribut[ed] to a crash in the popularity of President George W. Bush during his
second term and to the election of Barack Obama, who opposed the invasion in 2003").
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deed be viewed as one involving traditional harms, complete with sig-
nificant domestic harms and resulting social and political changes.
There are obvious similarities between the causes and effects of
the public scrutiny associated with the larger wars discussed above. In
each situation, the United States was faced with some, or even all, of
the traditional costs associated with war: a draft, an increasingly large
military industry, logistical sacrifices (such as rationing and other
noncombat expenses), and significant military casualties." 4 Ameri-
cans looking to keep the United States out of foreign affairs obviously
had a great deal on the line, which provided sufficient incentive to
scrutinize military policy. In the face of these potentially colossal
harms, the public was willing to assert a significant voice, which in
turn increased the willingness of politicians to challenge and subse-
quently shift presidential policy. As a result, public scrutiny and activ-
ism placed a President under constant scrutiny in one war, delayed
U.S. intervention in another, and even helped end two wars entirely.
Thus, we may extract a general principle from these events: when
faced with the prospect of a war requiring heavy domestic sacrifices,
and absent an incredibly compelling reason to engage in such a war
(as seen in World War II, for example),115 the public is properly in-
centivized to emerge and exert social (and, consequently, political)
pressure in order to engage and shift foreign policy. However, as we
will see, the converse is true as well.
B. The Introduction of Technology-Driven Warfare and Shifting
Wartime Doctrines
The recent actions in Libya illustrate the culmination of a shift
toward a new era of warfare, one that upsets the system of social and
political checks on presidential military action. Contrary to the series
of larger conflicts fought in the twentieth century, this new era has
ushered in a system of war devoid of some of the fundamental aspects
of war, including the traditional costs discussed above. Specifically,
through the advent of military technology, especially in the area of
robotics, modern-day hostilities no longer require domestic sacrifices,
thereby concealing the burden of war from mainstream conscious-
ness.1 1 6 By using fewer troops and introducing drones and other
114 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing "traditional" costs of war).
115 See David Greenberg, Advise and Dissent, SLATE (Mar. 26, 2003, 3:32 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news and-politics/history_1esson/2003/03/advise and_dissent.
html ("[T]he only major war that lacked an organized bloc of dissenters was World War
11 . . - .").
116 SeeSINGER, supra note 21, at 322 ("[R]obotics offer the public and their leaders the
lure of riskless warfare. All the potential gains of war would come without the costs, and
even be mildly entertaining.").
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forms of mechanized warfare into hostile areas more frequently,' 17 an
increased number of recent conflicts have managed to avoid many
domestic casualties, economic damages, and drafts.' 18 In a way, less is
on the line when drones, rather than people, take fire from enemy
combatants, and this reality displaces many hindrances and considera-
tions when deciding whether to use drones in the first place.1"
This move toward a limited form of warfare has been termed the
"Obama Doctrine," which "emphasizes air power and surgical strikes,
rather than boots on the ground." 20 Under this military framework,
as indicated by the recent use of drones in the Middle East, the tradi-
tional harms associated with war might become increasingly obsolete
as technology replaces the need for soldiers. Indeed, given the in-
creased level of firepower attached to drones, we can imagine a situa-
tion where large-scale military engagements are fought without any
American soldiers being put in harm's way, without Americans having
to ration their food purchases, and without teenagers worrying about
being drafted. 12 1 For example, " [w]ith no oxygen- and sleep-needing
human on board, Predators and other [unmanned aerial vehicles]
can watch over a potential target for 24 hours or more-then attack
when opportunity knocks." 22 Thus, if the recent actions in Libya are
any indication of what the future will look like, we can predict a major
shift in the way the United States carries out wars .123
117 See Tony Rock, Note, Yesterday's Laws, Tomorrow's Technology: The Laws of War and
Unmanned Warfare, 24 N.Y. Irr'L L. REv. 39, 40 (2011) (arguing that the use of drones has
become "an integral weapon in the war on terror").
118 See SINGER, supra note 21, at 319 (noting that robotics have created a system of
warfare "[w]ith no draft,. . . no tax or war bonds, and now the knowledge that the Ameri-
cans at risk are mainly just American machines"); Lori Montgomery, The Cost of War, Unno-
ticed, WAsH. PosT, May 8, 2007, at DI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/07/AR2007050701582.html (noting that taxpayers have felt
few ill financial effects of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the wars' high costs).
119 For example, Singer notes that, in a country that employs mechanized warfare, "[a)
leader needn't carry out any kind of consensus building that is normally needed before a
war, and doesn't even need to unite the country behind the effort." SINGER, supra note 21,
at 319-20.
120 See Michael C. Dorf, The "Obama Doctrine": The Wisdom and Lawfulness of the Presi-
dent's Take-No-Prisoners Approach, JUSTIA.COM (Oct. 24, 2011), http://verdictjustia.com/
2011/10/24/the-obama-doctrine.
121 Illustrating that this scenario is not as farfetched as it might seem, the Navy recently
tested a semiautonomous drone, capable of striking targets without any direct human con-
trol. See W.J. Hennigan, New Drone Has No Pilot Anywhere, So Whos Accountable?, L.A. TIMEs,
Jan. 26, 2012, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-auto-drone-20120126,0,740306.story?
article.
122 Jim Krane, Pilotless Warriors Soar to Success, CBS NEws.com (Feb. 11, 2009, 8:43 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/04/25/tech/main551126.shtml.
123 Though this Note has focused solely on the technological side of contemporary
warfare, it is worth mentioning that there has been increased use of private security forces
to carry out military actions abroad, as the use of mercenaries plays on the same themes
discussed here: private forces are easy to mobilize, they avoid the political costs of doing so,
and create the issue of dulling public interest and awareness. See Deborah Avant, War,
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C. The Effects of Technology-Driven Warfare on Politics and
Social Movements
The practical effects of this move toward a technology-driven, and
therefore limited, proxy style of warfare are mixed. On the one hand,
the removal of American soldiers from harm's way is a clear benefit, 1 2 4
as is the reduced harm to the American public in general. For that,
we should be thankful. But there is another effect that is less easy to
identify: public apathy. By increasing the use of robotics and decreas-
ing the probability of harm to American soldiers, modern warfare has
"affect[ed] the way the public views and perceives war" by turning it
into "the equivalent of sports fans watching war, rather than citizens
sharing in its importance." 25 As a result, the American public has
slowly fallen victim to the numbing effect of technology-driven war-
fare; when the risks of harm to American soldiers abroad and civilians
at home are diminished, so too is the public's level of interest in for-
eign military policy. 126
In the political sphere, this effect snowballs into both an uncaring
public not able (or willing) to effectively mobilize in order to chal-
lenge presidential action and enforce the WPR, and a Congress whose
own willingness to check presidential military action is heavily tied to
public opinion.127 Recall, for example, the case of the Mayaguez,
where potentially unconstitutional action went unchecked because
the mission was perceived to be a success. 128 Yet we can imagine that
most missions involving drone strikes will be "successful" in the eyes of
Recruitment Systems, and Democracy, in IN WAR's WAKE: INTERNATIONAL CONFUCr AND THE
FATE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRAcy 235, 245-50 (Elizabeth Kier & Ronald R. Krebs eds., 2010).
The difference is that the level of attenuation is not as significant when using private con-
tractors; as Avant notes, Americans tend to ignore the distinction between private and
recruited soldiers in reacting to their deaths. See id. at 249-50. That same equivalence can
hardly be found when reacting to the death of a soldier versus the death of a drone; thus,
the focus here is on the more extreme form of separation between public concerns and
battlefield realities.
124 See Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, War Evolves with Drones, Some Tiny as Bugs,
N.Y. TIMEs,June 20, 2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/world/
20drones.html?_r-2&ref=unmannedaerialvehicles ("[N]o one disputes that drones save
American lives.").
125 SINGER, supra note 21, at 318; see also MCINNEs, supra note 108, at 136-37 (noting
that technology "plays to American fantasies," which "misses the brutal reality of war: that
war is unpredictable; . . . that mistakes are made; that no matter the technology, if the
strategy is not right then the war will fail; and that in war, people die").
126 See Stephen L. Carter, The Iraq War, the Next War, and the Future of the Fat Man, 64
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 46, 49 (2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/iraq-war-
next-war ("The policy of using remote attacks to eliminate our enemies is one to which the
public pays less and less attention."); Mandel, supra note 44, at 806 ("[M]ilitary deploy-
ments involving tens or hundreds of thousands of American soldiers that could cost
thousands of American lives will, of course, receive greater attention and scrutiny from the
American public.").
127 See supra Part I.A.3.
128 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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the public: even if a strike misses a target, the only "loss" one needs to
worry about is the cost of a wasted missile, and the ease of deploying
another drone would likely provide a quick remedy. Given the politi-
cal risks associated with making critical statements about military ac-
tion, especially if that action results in success,129 We can expect even
less congressional WPR enforcement as more military engagements
are supported (or, at the very least, ignored) by the public. In this
respect, the political reaction to the Mayaguez seems to provide an ex-
ample of the rule, rather than the exception, in gauging political reac-
tions within a technology-driven warfare regime.
Thus, when the public becomes more apathetic about foreign af-
fairs as a result of the limited harms associated with technology-driven
warfare, and Congress's incentive to act consequently diminishes, the
President is freed from any possible WPR constraints we might expect
him to face, regardless of any potential legal issues.130 Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, nearly all of the constitutionally problematic conflicts car-
ried out by presidents involved smaller-scale military actions, rarely
totaling more than a few thousand troops in direct contact with hos-
tile forces.' 3 ' Conversely, conflicts that have included larger forces,
which likely provided sufficient incentive for public scrutiny, have
generally complied with domestic law.132
The result is that as wars become more limited,133 unilateral pres-
idential action will likely become even more unchecked as the triggers
for WPR enforcement fade away. In contrast with the social and politi-
cal backlash witnessed during the Civil War, World War I, the Vietnam
War, and the Iraq War, contemporary military actions provide insuffi-
cient incentive to prevent something as innocuous and limited as a
drone strike. Simply put, technology-driven warfare is not conducive
to the formation of a substantial check on presidential action. 34
129 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
130 See SOBEL, supra note 104, at 15 ("Popular presidents tend to engage in the use of
force short of war because higher popularity levels 'free' them from the domestic con-
straints that would otherwise inhibit resort of force.").
131 See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
132 See Mandel, supra note 44, at 805 (noting that in "[h]igher-[ilntensity" conflicts,
such as the Gulf War and the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, presidents have had
little trouble obtaining explicit congressional authorization to use military force).
133 See Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 28, at 449 ("[M]odern war is limited war.").
134 Admittedly, this Note has assumed thus far that civil participation during (or in the
days preceding) military action is necessarily a positive development, and will later argue
that such control can help prevent future conflict and the costs that follow. See infra Part
III.A. However, the ability to sway decision makers during war does not necessarily create
such benefits and can even help exacerbate many of the worst symptoms of war. Consider,
for example, the days following Pearl Harbor, where public sentiment pushed both the
military and politicians toward Japanese internment. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PEIULOUS
TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERROR-
isM 296 (2004). In that situation, and given the benefit of hindsight, an apathetic populace
might have actually helped America avoid a cost of war (namely, rights-restrictive measures).
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III
THE WAR PowERs RESOLUTION IN THE ERA OF
TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN WARFARE
A. Why an Unconstrained Executive Matters Today
If public scrutiny acts as a check on presidential action by pressur-
ing Congress into enforcing domestic law (namely, the WPR), then
that check has weakened given the increased use of technology-driven
warfare abroad. 35 As a result, fewer checks on presidential military
actions exist, implying that we will see more instances of unilateral
presidential initiatives. But if the new era of warfare removes the very
issues associated with traditional warfare, should we be concerned
about the American public's increasing numbness to it all? The an-
swer is undoubtedly yes.
First, from a practical standpoint, the psychology surrounding
mechanized warfare makes it easier for the United States to enter hos-
tilities initially.'36 Without having to worry about any of the tradi-
tional costs of war (such as a draft, rationing, casualties, etc.), the
triggers that have historically made the public wary of war are now
gone. When machines, rather than human beings, are on the front
lines, the public (and, as a result, politicians and courts) will not act to
stop the continued use of drones. In other words, people will simply
stop caring about our increased actions abroad, regardless of their
validity, constitutionality, or foreign harm.
But again one must wonder: should we care? After all, even if we
increase the number of military conflicts abroad, the repercussions
hardly seem worth worrying about. For example, worrying that WPR
violations will cause significant harm to the United States seems some-
what misplaced given the limited nature of technology-driven warfare.
Granted, this style of warfare might make it easier to enter hostilities,
but the risk of subsequent harm (at least to the United States) is low
enough to mitigate any real danger. Furthermore, even if the effects
of warfare might become increasingly dulled, any use of force that
would eventually require traditional, Vietnam-esque types of harms as
the result of technology-driven warfare would in a sense "wake up the
populace" in order to check potentially unconstitutional action. 37
But while the months following Pearl Harbor are illuminating in terms of how a populace's
fear can take hold of an entire government, the scope of this Note entails examining the
role popular opinion plays in entering a military conflict, not responding to that conflict
once it has already ramped up.
135 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 119 and accompanying text; see also Bumiller & Shanker, supra note
124 ("[D]rones can turn war into a videogame ... and, with no Americans directly at risk,
more easily draw the United States into conflicts.").
137 For example, if a country responded in a manner that would require the United
States to begin using ground troops (say, by retaliating with drones of their own), the
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Thus, if our level of involvement requires machines and only ma-
chines, why worry about a restrained level of public scrutiny?
The answer is that a very real risk of harm exists nonetheless.
War by its very nature is unpredictable.13 8 Indeed, one of the major
grievances concerning the war in Vietnam was that we ended up in a
war we did not sign up for in the first place.' 3 9 The problem is not the
initial action itself but the escalation. Therefore, while drone strikes
might not facially involve any large commitment, the true threat is the
looming possibility of escalation. 140 That threat exists in the context
of drones, whether because of the risk of enemy retaliation or because
of a general fear that an initial strike would snowball into a situation
that would require troops on the ground.141 In both cases, an appar-
ently harmless initial action could eventually unravel into a situation
involving harms associated with traditional warfare.142 Worse yet,
even if that blowback was sufficient to incentivize the populace and
Congress to mobilize, the resulting involvement would only occur af-
ter the fact.143 If we want restraints on presidential action, they
should be in place before the United States is thrown into a war, and
this would require public awareness about the use of drones.'" As
such, whether it is unforeseen issues arising out of the drones them-
selves145 or unforeseen consequences stemming from what was osten-
sibly a minor military undertaking, there is reason to worry about a
subsequent escalation would likely provide a clear signal to the public that it is time to act.
In that respect, technology-driven warfare could actually result in more WPR scrutiny once
adversaries respond.
138 See SINGER, supra note 21, at 323 ("It's in [war's] very nature to be complex, messy,
and unpredictable.").
139 See SOBEL, supra note 104, at 53-55 (discussing the U.S. escalation in Vietnam, be-
ginning with strategic bombings but eventually growing to tens of thousands of ground
troops, and the discontent that grew as a result).
140 See SINGER, supra note 21, at 322 ("It was the lure of an easy preemptive action that
got the United States into such trouble in Iraq in the first place.").
141 See McINNES, supra note 108, at 139 (noting that the shift toward a style of warfare
emphasizing technological superiority might result in a backlash that would give America's
enemies an incentive to resort to the type of warfare that the West wants to avoid (e.g., wars
requiring ground troops)).
142 The recent news story concerning the loss of a U.S. drone in Iran provides a partic-
ularly gripping example of this risk, as tensions between the two countries have risen as the
result of an ostensibly innocuous robotic surveillance mission. See Scott Shane & David E.
Sanger, Crash of Stealth C.I.A. Drone in Iran Reveals Secret US. Surveillance Effort, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2011, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/world/middleeast/
drone-crash-in-iran-reveals-secret-us-surveillance-bid.html?r=1l.
143 Recall the success of antiwar movements before World War I, which managed to
keep Americans out of the war for over two years, likely saving hundreds of thousands of
lives. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
144 See ELY, supra note 15, at 45 ("The nation shouldn't be permitted to 'slide into' war
An unambiguous in-or-out vote should be required at the outset.").
145 See, e.g., Bumiller & Shanker, supra note 124 (reporting that a malfunctioning
drone entered restricted airspace in Washington, D.C., nearly causing fighter jets to be
scrambled).
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populace who is unable to exert any influence on military actions,
even as we shift toward a more limited form of warfare.146
Another issue associated with a toothless WPR in the era of tech-
nology-drive warfare involves humanitarian concerns. If one takes the
more abstract position that the public should not allow actions that
will kill human beings to go unchecked, regardless of their legality or
underlying rationale, then that position faces serious pressure in the
era of technology-driven warfare. As the human aspect of warfare be-
comes more attenuated, the potential humanitarian costs associated
with war will fade out of the collective consciousness, making it easier
for the United States to act in potentially problematic ways without
any substantial backlash. Rather than take note of whom we target
abroad, for example, the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare
forces the public to place "enormous trust in our leaders" despite the
fact that good faith reliance on intelligence reports does not necessa-
rily guarantee their accuracy.14 7 Accordingly, as the level of public
scrutiny decreases, so too will our ability to limit unwarranted humani-
tarian damage abroad.14 8 At the very least, some dialogue should oc-
cur before any fatal action is taken; yet, in the technology-driven
warfare regime, that conversation never occurs.'49
Of course, this Note has argued that the issues associated with
technology-driven warfare (an increased level of military involvement
abroad, potential for escalation, humanitarian difficulties, etc.)
though very real, are less prominent than the harms associated with
traditional warfare. But perhaps this premise is incorrect; that is, per-
haps technology-driven warfare does present sufficient harm to trigger
social and political scrutiny. For example, pecuniary harms are very
real contemporary concerns, and they seem to play an increased role
in determining a country's standing.'50 In this respect, given the fi-
146 Consider environmental policy, which faces a similar hurdle: U.S. policies that have
small or zero immediate costs, but that might create larger issues in the long run, may not
spur social or political protest until it is too late. See John M. Broder, Environmentalists
Cooling on Obama, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 2010, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/02/18/science/earth/18enviros.html (noting that "action on environmental issues
has slowed" and that "[einvironmental advocates largely remained silent" in 2009).
147 See Carter, supra note 126.
148 See, e.g., Hakim Almasmari, Suspected US. Drone Strike Kills Civilians in Yemen, Officials
Say, CNN.com (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/03/world/meast/yemen-
drone-strike/?hpt=hpt3.
149 The Defense Department does not even keep track of the number of civilians killed
by drones. SeeJustin Elliott, U.S. Doesn't Count Civilians Killed by Drones, SALON (Mar. 23,
2011, 5:07 PM), http://www.salon.com/2011/03/23/pakistan_drones_civilian-casualties/.
150 See Howard LaFranchi, How the Iraq War Has Changed America, CmrusTIAN Sc. MON.
TOR (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2 0 11/1210/How-
the-Iraq-war-has-changed-America (noting the heavy monetary burden the war in Iraq has
placed on the United States and its detrimental long-term impact).
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nancial costs of drone strikes (and military spending in general),' 5 1
perhaps we need not be worried about an absence of public scrutiny.
Yet given the traditional costs of war, pecuniary harm hardly
seems like the type of concern sufficient to create the type of political
checks present in the Civil War, World War I, Vietnam, or Iraq. In all
four situations, American lives were at stake, entire households faced
life-changing effects of war in a very real way, and the entire country
saw major social and political transformations. Economic harm is cer-
tainly an issue worth considering, especially as the United States takes
on more and more debt; yet, whether that sort of harm rises to the
level sufficient to trigger mass citizen mobilization remains to be
seen. 5 2 Indeed, if the recent actions in Libya are any indication, fi-
nancial harm is far too attenuated to create any sort of substantial
backlash. Future technology-driven conflicts will likely create a
clearer picture of the role of pecuniary damage, but as it stands, this
sort of harm fails to "rally the troops" for public attentiveness.
B. Why Existing Theories of Presidential Constraint Are No
Longer Sufficient
Naturally, some have argued that an unchecked President is not
necessarily an issue at all. Specifically, in The Executive Unbound, Eric
Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that the lack of presidential con-
straint is actually a rational development: we want a President who can
act with alacrity, especially in a world where quick decisions may be
necessary (e.g., capturing a terrorist).' 53 But rather than worry about
this progression, Posner and Vermeule argue that sufficient political
restraints remain in place to prevent a president from acting reck-
lessly, making the inability of legal constraints (such as the WPR) to
curtail presidential action a moot point.'5 4 Specifically, a mix of "elec-
tions, parties, bureaucracy, and the media" acts as an adequate con-
straint on presidential action, even absent any legal checks on the
151 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
152 In fact, technology-driven warfare might decrease the pecuniary cost of war. See
Krane, supra note 122 (noting that drones "are expected to cost a third as much as Lock-
heed Martin's . .. next-generation manned fighter").
153 See Eiuc A. POSNER & AmUAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: ASTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBuc 14-15 (2010) ("[E]xecutive-centered government in the administra-
tive state is inevitable, and [the] law cannot hope to constrain the modem executive."); see
abo id. at 207-08 (presenting the days following 9/11 and the 2008 financial crisis as two
examples of the growing extensiveness of presidential power).
154 See id. at 176 (arguing that "liberal legalists overlook the importance of de facto
constraints arising from politics, and thus equate a legally unconstrained executive with
one that is unconstrained tout court).
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executive.155 Posner and Vermeule find that presidential credibility
and popularity create a deep incentive for presidents to constrain
their own power. This restraint does not arise from a sense of uphold-
ing the Constitution or fear of political backlash, but from the public
itself.'5 6 Because of these nonlegal constraints, the authors conclude
that the fear of an unconstrained President (one that has the poten-
tial to go so far as tyranny) is unwarranted.15 7
The problem with such a theory is that the requisite social and
political awareness that might have existed in large-scale wars has
largely disappeared, allowing the President to act without any fear of
diminished credibility or popularity. Specifically, Posner and
Vermeule seem to rely on public attentiveness in order to check presi-
dential action but do not seem to consider a situation where public
scrutiny fails to materialize. The authors place an important caveat in
their argument: "As long as the public informs itself and maintains a skepti-
cal attitude toward the motivations of government officials, the executive can
operate effectively only by proving over and over that it deserves the
public's trust."158 But what happens when such skepticism and scru-
tiny vanish? The authors premise their argument on a factor that
does not exist in a regime that utilizes technology-driven warfare. If
credibility is what controls a President, and an apathetic populace
does not care enough to shift its political views based on the use of
technology-driven warfare abroad, then a President need not worry
about public sentiment when deciding whether to use such force.
This in turn means that the theory of self-restraint on the part of the
President fails to account for contemporary warfare and its social im-
pact, making the problem of public numbing very pertinent. 1 5 9
CONCLUSION
On June 21, 2011, the United States lost contact with a Fire Scout
helicopter flying over Libya. Military authorities ultimately concluded
155 Id. at 209; see also id. at 113 ("[T]he system of elections, the party system, and
American political culture constrain the executive far more than do legal rules created by
Congress or the courts.").
156 See id. at 4 ("[Tlhe major constraints on the executive, especially in crises, do not
arise from law or from the separation-of-powers framework defended by liberal legalists,
but from politics and public opinion.").
157 See id, at 204-05.
158 Id. at 209 (emphasis added); see also id. at 208 (relying on an implicit public aware-
ness when arguing that "[dieclarations of emergency not justified by publicly visible events
would be met with skepticism" and that "[a]ctions said to be justified by emergency would
not be approved if the justification were not plausible").
159 See Ronald R. Krebs, In the Shadow of War: The Effects of Conflict on Liberal Dewcracy,
63 INT'L ORc. 177, 201-02 (2009) (noting that Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule's execu-
tive enthusiasm fails to account for either the potential for presidential abuse or the ab-
sence of political and social costs that would follow).
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that Qaddafi forces shot the helicopter down, adding to the final cost
of America's intervention. 6 0 Yet there would be no outrage back
home: no candlelit vigils, no congressional lawsuits, no protests at the
White House gates, no demands for change. Instead, few people
would even know of the Fire Scout's plight, and even fewer would
care. That is because the Fire Scout helicopter was a drone, a pilotless
machine adding only a few digits to the final "cost" of the war, hardly
worth anyone's time or effort.
As these situations become more and more common-where
postwar assessments look at monetary, rather than human costs-the
fear of unilateral presidential action similarly becomes more perti-
nent. Unlike past larger-scale wars, whose traditional harms provided
sufficient incentive for the populace to exert pressure on the Presi-
dent (either directly or via Congress), technology-driven warfare has
removed the triggers for checks on presidential action. And though
the military actions that have raised WPR issues involved limited,
small-scale operations, the volatile and unpredictable nature of war-
fare itself could eventually put American lives in danger, a risk worth
considering given the increased use of drones abroad.
Thus, the same conditions are now in place as when the WPR was
enacted, creating a need to revisit the importance of the WPR in light
of the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare. Although it
might be tempting to simply write off the WPR as a failed experiment
in aggressive congressional maneuvering given its inability to prevent
unilateral presidential action in the past, the new era of warfare and
its effects on the populace has created a newfound sense of urgency,
one that requires a strong statutory barrier between the President and
military action abroad. Thus, we need stronger WPR enforcement as
it becomes easier to enter into "hostilities."
While others focus on the WPR itself,e'6 the emphasis of this Note
is on the public's role in preventing unilateral presidential action. In
this respect, the simplest solution for the numbing effect of contem-
porary warfare is an increased level of public attentiveness and scru-
tiny concerning military actions abroad, regardless of the lack of
160 See Libya Conflict: NATO Loses Drone Helicopter, BBC NEWS (June 21, 2011), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13858200.
161 Possible solutions have ranged from amending the WPR, see FISHER, supra note 34,
at 191-94 (suggesting ways to fix the WPR while also arguing that "[t]o repeal it .. . would
send the wrong signal"); Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALIsM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AF-
FAiRS 90 (1990) ("The resolution is not well drafted and does not do what the authors
sought to do; it needs to be rewritten."); Ely, supra note 47, at 1385 (presenting ways to
strengthen the terms of the WPR), to outright repealing it, see TURNER, Supra note 39, at
131-33 ("Now that its failure has been demonstrated ... Congress could take a valuable
first step in the direction of improved legislative-executive cooperation . .. by repealing the
War Powers Resolution."); Fisher & Adler, supra note 26, at 16-18 (discussing the merits of
repealing the WPR).
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visible costs at home. As we have seen, once the public becomes vigi-
lant about our less-visible foreign actions, we can expect our politi-
cians to become receptive to domestic law. But as this Note points
out, the issues surrounding a toothless WPR will continue to grow and
amplify as society enters a new age of technology-driven warfare.
Thus, there is a pressing need for greater public awareness of the new,
and perhaps less obvious, consequences of our actions abroad.162 Per-
haps taking note of these unforeseen costs will improve the public's
inquiry into potential illegal action abroad and create real incentives
to enforce the WPR.
162 E.g., Peter W. Singer, Op-Ed., Do Drones Undermine Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2012, at SR5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/opinion/sunday/do-
drones-undermine-democracy.html?_r=1&sep=1&sq=do%20drones%20undermine%20de-
mocracy&st=cse.
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